BETTER TO GIVE THAN TO RECEIVE:
EVALUATING RECENT IP DONATION TAX
POLICY CHANGES
DON MACBEAN1

ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, charitable contributions of intellectual
property have grown rapidly. This growth has coincided with
tremendous abuse as firms have sought inflated valuations of
donated intellectual property in order to claim larger tax
deductions. In 2004, Congress responded by passing section 882 of
the American Jobs Creation Act, which drastically changed the
rules governing donations of intellectual property. This iBrief
argues that Congress, in addressing overvalued intellectual
property donations, went too far in its efforts by failing to fully
consider the importance of positive donor incentives. After
discussing other proposed policies, this iBrief suggests a hybrid
policy that combines strong donor incentives with protective
measures against overvaluation.

INTRODUCTION
For many corporations, donating “orphan patents”2 and other
intellectual property (IP) to tax-exempt entities is much more than just a
philanthropic endeavor. Tax deductions for these donations3 make them an
effective means of cutting costs.4 While the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
¶1
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J.D. Candidate 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Economics,
2003, Brigham Young University. He is currently serving as managing editor of
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2
Orphan patents are patents that are inconsistent with a company’s main
technologies, are poor candidates for licensing to third parties, and have no
defensive competitive market purposes. RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCH, IP
DONATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (Int’l Intellectual Prop. Inst. 2004) at
http://www.iipi.org/reports/IP_Donations_Policy_Review.pdf [hereinafter IP
DONATIONS].
3
See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing a general deduction for
charitable contributions).
4
DR. DAVID MARTIN, SPECIAL REPORT: PATENT DONATIONS 2 (M·CAM 2003)
(identifying beneficial consequences of donating intellectual property) at
http://www.m-cam.com/downloads/20030108_donation-whitepaper.pdf.
Because maintaining patents requires the payment of annual fees, patent
donation not only results in tax deductions but it also lowers the costs of the
donor.
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has explicitly condoned this practice for at least 40 years,5 only recently
have corporations begun the see its far reaching benefits.6 Unfortunately,
the recent proliferation of IP donations has been accompanied with abuse as
some donors have overstated the value of their donations in an effort to
claim inflated tax deductions.7
¶2
In response to this and other concerns, Congress drastically changed
the law regarding the charitable donation of IP by enacting section 882 of
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Creation Act),8 which is currently
part of section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).9 Instead of
permitting a fair market value (FMV) deduction of the donated IP, Congress
limited the allowable deduction to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost
basis.10 Section 882 allows additional deductions on the donated property’s
future revenue on a decreasing sliding-scale basis.11 This iBrief explains the
steps leading up to Congress’s modification of the tax law that governs IP
donations, and focuses on one of Congress’s leading motivators: the
overvaluation of IP.12 It then argues that while Congress’s legislation
effectively deals with the problem of overvalued IP donations, it failed to
fully consider the importance of donor incentives. After considering
alternative policies, this iBrief proposes a hybrid policy that minimizes the
overvaluation of IP while still preserving strong incentives for donations.

5

Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126.
Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the Shelf: Tax Benefits
Can be Focused for Greater Good, 27 LEGAL TIMES 30 (2004) [hereinafter
Greater Good].
7
See 150 CONG. REC. S. 11019-20 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Grassley). See also Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at
Stopping Abuses, 102 TAX NOTES 699, 700-01 (Feb. 9, 2004) (explaining a
proposal aimed at stopping excessive deductions due to overvaluation of
intellectual property) [hereinafter Stopping Abuses].
8
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-755, at 532-35 (2004) (comparing section 682, later
changed to 882, of H.R. 4520 with previous law), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/hr4520/hr4520conreptmgrsstatement
3.pdf [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
9
H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 882 (2004).
10
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005); H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 882
(2004). The cost basis for IP generally consists of the asset’s historical cost less
accumulated depreciation. See 26 CFR 1.167(a)-6 (2000).
11
I.R.C. § 170(m)(7) (LexisNexis 2005).
12
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310 (listing four primary concerns of
the IRS with respect to charitable contributions of IP).
6
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I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NEW LEGISLATION.
A. History of Charitable IP Donations
¶3
The practice of claiming charitable deductions for donated IP is of
fairly recent origin.13 The IRS first addressed this practice in the late 1950s
through Revenue Ruling 58-260,14 giving taxpayers explicit authority to
claim deductions for IP donated to certain qualified entities such as
universities.15 Despite this ruling, the level of charitable IP donations
remained stagnant16 until the Bayh-Dole Act of 198017 provided a
conducive environment for donations. This Act empowered universities and
other not-for-profit organizations to reap the commercial benefits of patents
developed through federally funded research18 and provided incentive for
these entities to develop the infrastructure necessary to accept large-scale IP
donations.19 Only then did the charitable contribution of IP begin to
proliferate.20
¶4
Prior to the enactment of Section 882, the IRS permitted IP holders
to deduct the FMV of IP donated to qualified not-for-profit entities.21 The
policy behind this long-standing tradition was to encourage philanthropy by
allowing taxpayers to contribute to their chosen charitable organizations at a
subsidized cost.22 However, faith in this system began to waiver due to a
variety of abuses during the late 1990s, such as the overvaluation of
corporate IP donations.23 Responding to growing discord, the IRS issued a
series of statements24 and notices,25 including one specifically warning
13

IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
15
Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4; See
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000) (defining exempt organizations).
16
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
17
35 U.S.C. § 200-12 (2000).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 5.
20
See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
21
I.R.C. § 170(e)(B) (2000); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 532.
22
JACOB MERTEN, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 31:01
(Westlaw 2003). The cost is subsidized in the sense that the allowable tax
deductions for the value of a charitable donation reduces the economic cost of
the donation.
23
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Finance, Grassley
Advances Crackdown on Car, Intellectual Property Donation Abuses (Oct. 6,
2004), at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prg100604d.pdf
[hereinafter Press Release]; Fred Stokeld, JOBS Act Would Halt Inflated Values
of Charitable Donations, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 285 (Jun. 2004).
24
See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from
Happening to Good Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S.
14
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taxpayers and IP “promoters and appraisers”26 that abuse of the charitable
donation provisions of the tax code may result in penalties.27

B. What Caused the Abuse?
¶5
By the early 1990s, the growing importance of IP resulted in
creation of a “new measure of corporate assets: IP Asset Management.”28 In
response, several national accounting firms formed special consulting
groups to help corporations manage their inventory of patents and other
IP.29 Consultants soon realized that many corporations “were spending
millions of dollars a year on [patent] maintenance fees,”30 some of which
were protecting orphan patents that were not even being used.31 Consultants
and company executives alike realized that prudent cost management
required donating or abandoning these orphan patents.32 For many
corporations, the tax benefits associated with donation made it an attractive
option.33 The goodwill generated by charitable contributions, both within
the community and with the donee, provided corporations with another
reason to donate IP.34

1. Factors Facilitating the Abuse
¶6
Given the financial benefits of donating orphan patents and other
IP, some abuse of the system is not surprising. This abuse has been
facilitated primarily by the difficulty of valuing IP35 and the lack of strict
Senate, 108th Cong. (June 22, 2004) (written statement of Mark W. Everson,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204metest.pdf.
25
I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310; see also Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1
C.B. 594.
26
I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310.
27
Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6700, 6701, 6694 (West Supp. 2004).
28
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2. Corporations often divide their assets into
subgroups for accounting and other purposes (e.g. accounts receivable). IP Asset
Management is one such subgroup, comprised solely of IP.
29
Id.
30
Greater Good, supra note 6 (describing the wasted fees of “innovative
companies like the IBM Corp.”).
31
Id.
32
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2.
33
See Barnaby J. Feder, Patent Donations Are Novel Corporate Gift, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at §3 page 5 (explaining that one corporation experienced
a 3% reduction in its average tax rate due to patent donations); see also Greater
Good, supra note 6 (relating that a company claimed a savings of over $40
million during a five year period from donating patents).
34
MARTIN, supra note 4.
35
Terri W. Cammarano & Richard F. Riley, Jr., Valuation Remains the
Toughest Issue When Donating Patents, 7 VALUATION STRATEGIES 18 (2003);
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appraisal standards and guidelines.36 Valuation of IP is difficult in part
because patents confer a right to prevent someone else from doing
something, making their value somewhat dependent on the willingness of
the holder to sue.37 Also, value depends on possible future income streams,
the property’s technical feasibility, and many other factors that are similarly
difficult to predict.38 Further complicating the issue is the inadequacy of
IRS guidance with respect to valuation methods of IP.39 Today, there are
several different methods of pricing,40 each of which may result in widely
varying estimates of the same IP.41 For example, one corporate executive of
a company experienced in donating patents reported remarkably divergent
estimates on the value of a patent, with the highest appraisal being four
times greater than the lowest appraisal.42
¶7
Another problem that facilitated abuse was the IRS’s relaxed
standards with respect to “qualified appraisers.”43 The IRS guidelines define
a “qualified appraiser” merely as someone who “holds himself or herself
out to the public as an appraiser”44 and who signs a document
acknowledging that he or she understands the legal consequences of
intentional overvaluation.45 While the IRS requires the donor to show the
valuation’s accuracy,46 the subjective nature of valuating IP47 makes any
rebuttal difficult except in the most extreme cases. These regulations hardly
facilitate uniform valuation standards, and may have lead in part to many of
the overvaluation abuses.48

2. What Abuses Were Most Common?

Brenda Sandburg, Tax Write-Offs, Written Off: The IRS Cracks Down on Patent
Donation Deductions, 04 IP LAW & BUS. 16 (Mar. 2004); Greater Good, supra
note 7.
36
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40.
37
Sandburg, supra note 35.
38
Cammarano & Riley, supra note 35, at 28.
39
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40.
40
Methods of pricing include the income method, the market approach, and the
cost method. Milton Cerny, Technology Transfer and the New Economy, 47
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 39, 46 (Jan. 2005); Cammarano & Riley, supra note 37;
Smith v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981).
41
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7; Greater Good, supra note 7.
42
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
43
Id. at 40-41.
44
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i) (West 2005).
45
Id. at § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)(D).
46
Cammarano & Riley, supra note 35.
47
Greater Good, supra note 6 (arguing that patent valuations are often
subjective and unreliable).
48
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 41.
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The IRS has listed four areas of abuse for which it has particular
concern: (1) excessive valuation of donated property; (2) inadequate
substantiation of donations; (3) claiming excessive deductions when
consideration is received; and (4) claiming deductions for the transfer of a
partial interest. 49 This iBrief considers the problem of overvaluation.
¶8

¶9
As suggested above, a common method of abuse involved inflating
the price of donated patents, thereby permitting donors to take larger than
appropriate deductions.50 SBC Communications, which has been accused of
claiming a deduction of over $7 million for donating an allegedly worthless
patent,51 is just one example of this type of abuse. Companies such as
Dupont and Eaton Corporation have also taken large deductions for patents
of questionable value.52
¶10
By the year 2000, donees began to realize that some IP cost more in
annual maintenance fees than their alleged value.53 The University of
Virginia, for example, ended up loosing money on a donated patent valued
at more than $7 million.54 A professor involved later commented that “[t]he
bottom line is that it cost us money with no benefit.”55 By 2001, most
universities adapted to this reality by requiring donors to help pay for
maintenance fees on any IP they accepted.56 Soon, stories of inflated
valuations and other abuses involving charities became common
knowledge, even implicating accounting giant KPMG.57 By 2004, the abuse
was so prevalent that Congress, after discussing several legislative
proposals,58 passed section 882 of the Creation Act.

49

I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310.
150 CONG. REC. S. 11019-21 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); Press Release, supra note 24; Stopping Abuses, supra note 8.
51
Teresa Riordan, Patent Donations Are Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003,
at C1.
52
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 7-8, 10-11.
53
See Feder, supra note 33 (explaining that some patents are not worth their cost
in maintenance fees).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 6.
57
Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good
Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., at
7 (June 22, 2004) (statement of Jay D. Adkisson, Editor of Quatloos.com),
available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204jatest.pdf.
58
Jerry J. McCoy, Contributions of Property: Winds of Change Blowing?,
SK041 ALI-ABA 369, 376 (2004). See, e.g., S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 494 (2004);
Everson, supra note 24.
50
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II. SECTION 882
A. The Framework
¶11
Section 882 attempts to curtail overvaluation of IP by limiting any
deductions to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost basis.59 Subject to the
following four requirements, the donor may receive additional deductions
based upon the revenue the donee generates from the donated property.60
First, additional deductions are limited to the aggregate donee earnings
generated from the donated property that exceed the original donor
deduction.61 For example, suppose company A donates a patent to
university B valued at $2 million dollars with a basis of $100,000. Assume
further that during the first (the year of donation), second and third years, B
earns $50,000, $75,000 and $100,000, respectively. For the first year, the
donor will be able to deduct the lesser of the patent’s FMV or its basis; here,
$100,000. A would not be able to deduct any additional amount during the
first year because $50,000 < $100,000. In the second year A would be able
to deduct $25,000 ($50,000 + $75,000 - $100,000 = $25,000).
¶12
Second, Section 882, now part of the IRC, creates a sliding scale
that decreases the amount a donor can deduct based on earnings of the
donee in future years.62 During the first (year of donation) and second years
after the donation, aggregate earnings that surpass the deduction allowed for
the initial charitable gift are completely deductible.63 In subsequent years, a
sliding scale reduces the deductibility of the donee’s earnings.64 During the
third year after the donation, the donor may deduct 90% of the donee’s
earnings.65 The rates drop to 80% and 70% for the fourth and fifth years,
respectively.66 The lowest rate of 10% is reached during the tenth year, and
no deductions are permitted after the twelfth year of the donation.67
Returning to the example above, university B earned $50,000, $75,000 and
$100,000 in the first through third years, respectively. Applying the slidingscale rule will not effect the deduction of $25,000 in the second year, but
will limit A’s deduction to $90,000 as opposed to $100,000 in the third year
($100,000 x .9 = $90,000).

59

I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005); see also CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 534; Fred Stokeld, ETI Repeal Bill Would Tighten Rules on
Vehicle, Patent Donations, 105 Tax Notes 293, 294 (Oct. 18, 2004).
60
I.R.C. § 170(m)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
61
Id. at (m)(2).
62
Id. at (m)(7).
63
Id. at (m)(1), (2), (7).
64
Id. at (m)(7).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at (m)(5).
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The IRC also prohibits the donor from deducting the value of any
earnings beyond the donated IP’s life.68 Finally, the IRC makes the
deductibility of future earnings contingent on certain filing requirements.
For example, after the donor informs the donee of its intent to take
additional deductions,69 the donee must then file annual returns reporting
the earnings generated by the donated IP.70 The donor must also acquire
written substantiation from the donee concerning those earnings.71
¶13

III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
A. Does it Really Matter?
¶14
There is much at stake in our nation’s patent and IP donation
policy. A strong relationship between the private business sector and our
nation’s research institutions would help create jobs, fuel the economy, and
develop the technology to “improve the lives of our citizens.”72
Furthermore, the International Intellectual Property Institute73 has
associated lagging international competitiveness and innovation, the risk of
failing to fully exploit current resources due to inefficient markets for
innovation, and the loss of patents and ideas through abandonment with
poor IP donation policies.74 Together, these considerations make a
compelling case for taking IP donation policy seriously.

B. What Does a Good Policy Contain?
Derek Bok, faculty chair of the Hauser Center on Non-profits at
Harvard University, has advised Congress that one of the biggest concerns
in the area of charitable contributions is that of over-legislating and
therefore doing more harm than good.75 Because of this concern, Bok
asserts that the best approach to addressing problems with charitable
¶15

68

Id. at (m)(6). The life of IP is the time period for which the property is
protected by a patent.
69
Id. at (m)(8)(B).
70
I.R.C. § 6050L(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
71
Id.
72
Cerny, supra note 40, at 47.
73
A not-for-profit organization “dedicated to increasing awareness and
understanding of the use of intellectual property as a tool for economic growth.”
INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., at
http://www.iipi.org/nav_about/background.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
74
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 11-12.
75
Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good
Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong.,
(Jun. 22, 2004) (statement of Derek Bok, chair of Hauser Center on Non-profits
and Philanthropy, Harvard University), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204dbtest.pdf.
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contributions is to target known abuses first,76 such as overvaluation, and
then to proceed with caution. With respect to IP specifically, in addition to
targeting known abuses, this iBrief argues that a good policy should also
create appropriate incentives for IP holders to donate their property to
organizations capable of putting it to good use,77 thereby benefiting
society.78

C. Analysis of Section 170
Overvaluation. Section 170 deals effectively with the problem of
overvaluation. However, rather than rigorously defining valuation
standards,79 the provision combats this problem by limiting a donor’s
deduction to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost basis.80 Substantiation
of the earnings is accomplished by requiring the donor to acquire financial
information from the donee regarding earnings from the patent.81 This
information must be reported to the IRS for the donor’s future deductions to
be valid.82
¶16

Incentives. Section 170 falls drastically short in the area of
incentives, primarily because the future earnings of the donation are only
partially deductible.83 Rightfully, this provision has been widely criticized
as being donor unfriendly.84 Some practitioners have noted that many
patents do not become profitable until several years after their donation,85
preventing donors from taking larger deductions for profitable patents. One
expert speculates that this provision may limit corporations to deducting no
more than 20% of the donated patent’s FMV.86 If true, this could
significantly reduce the flow of IP from corporations to universities and notfor-profit entities.87 Therefore, while Section 170 resolves the overvaluation
problem, its chilling effect on donations in general is problematic.
Certainly, a superior policy would encourage donations while also
correcting the overvaluation problem.
¶17

76

Id.
See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (arguing that only donees with strong
research technologies should be eligible for donated patents).
78
See Cerny, supra note 40, at 47.
79
See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that the lackadaisical IRS
guidelines are largely responsible for charitable contribution abuses).
80
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005).
81
I.R.C. § 6050L(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
82
Id.
83
See id. at § 170(m)(7) (displaying the sliding scale rate reduction).
84
Stopping Abuses, supra note 7.
85
Id.
86
Id. This is because FMV measurements typically include the future expected
revenues from an asset for a specified period of time.
87
See id.
77
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D. Possible Alternatives
1. American Society of Appraisers
¶18
The American Society of Appraisers (ASA) has made some
valuable suggestions88 for improving the previous FMV donation system.89
First, the IRS must strictly define a “qualified appraiser.” Current
regulations allow almost anyone, even someone without professional
training, to work as a qualified appraiser.90 Such a standard hardly promotes
accurate and consistent valuation. Second, the ASA suggests that the IRS
establish mandatory valuation guidelines for the appraisal of property.91
Finally, the ASA has argued that the IRS should monitor for high value
donations,92 allowing the agency to identify donations with
uncharacteristically high valuations.
¶19
Overvaluation. While the ASA’s call for specific standards for
qualified appraisers and appraisal methods addresses Congress
overvaluation concerns, the ASA’s confidence that workable standards
could be set remains questionable,93 especially considering the inherent
difficulty involved in valuating IP.94 Still, the IRS could set standards that,
if nothing else, would bring consistency to the process.
¶20
Incentives. This approach would continue to create incentives for IP
holders by allowing a full market value deduction for their patent. The
ASA’s suggestions, however, stop short of creating incentives for the donor
to find the best suited donee for their donation.

2. Consistent Policy?
¶21
Proponents of another plan argue that the recent changes to Section
170 are inconsistent with other tax laws and have therefore criticized
lawmakers for failing to use consistent policy rationales in crafting tax
legislation.95 They recommend a more consistent policy with an additional
safeguard for large donations. For example, the law could require two
appraisals for any donation exceeding a certain amount. Further, both
appraisals would have to come from members of an appraisal society

88

The ASA’s suggestions, while valuable, should be viewed with caution.
Clearly the ASA benefits from a system which grants a substantial amount of
responsibility to appraisers.
89
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40-41.
90
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i) (West 2005).
91
IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 41.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Greater Good, supra note 6.
95
Stopping Abuses, supra note 7, at 701.
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required to follow strict ethical guidelines.96 The final amount of the
deduction could be the average of the two estimates. A final addition to this
plan might limit donations to certain qualified research institutions that
would be capable of taking advantage of complex patents and other IP
products.97
¶22
Overvaluation. This plan addresses the overvaluation problem only
insofar as professional appraisers are able to develop their own valuation
guidelines and follow them. Without consistent valuation guidelines
throughout the industry, appraisals will likely continue to vary widely
depending on the appraiser used.98
¶23
Incentives. This proposal would encourage donations of IP by
assuring a FMV deduction. The provision requiring the donation to go to a
qualified donee is a good addition, although it could be more targeted.
Many institutions have research technologies, but some are better suited
than others, depending on the IP. A policy that encourages donors to give IP
to those entities best able to exploit it would increase the likelihood of
productive uses beneficial to society.99

E. Hybrid Proposal
¶24
The major disadvantage of the proposals outlined above is that they
lack a mechanism to ensure that orphan patents and other IP get into the
hands of the right donee.100 While Section 170 does provide donors with
incentive to find a good donee,101 the broader incentives for the actual
donation are too limited.102

A possible alternative combines the use of an initial FMV deduction
with an additional component to help insure the best suited donee has access
to the IP. Under this plan, an IP holder will be able to donate orphan patents
and deduct their FMV as determined by a qualified appraiser. Deduction of
¶25

96

See id. at 700 (suggesting additional, independent appraiser chosen by an
appraisal society).
97
Id.; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 9.
98
See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that even appraisals made in
good faith may vary substantially depending on the appraiser used); see also,
Cammarano & Riley, supra note 36 (showing that valuation of IP is very
difficult).
99
See Cerny, supra note 40, at 47; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing
that efficient allocation of IP benefits society).
100
See Feder, supra note 33.
101
An incentive for the donor to find a good donee is created because the former
is allowed additional future deductions if the IP generates sufficient revenue
within the first 11 years of the donation. See I.R.C. § 170(m)(7) (LexisNexis
2005).
102
See Stopping Abuses, supra note 7, at 700.
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the full amount will occur only if the company uses a third party broker
whose primary goal is matching donors with appropriate donees.103 The
broker will be either a government entity or a not-for-profit organization
paid by the government for this purpose. The funding for such a program
will be generated from the increased tax revenue resulting from more
accurate valuations.
¶26
The third party broker must have expertise with a wide variety of IP
and be in contact with universities and other appropriate donees on a regular
basis to keep apprised of what types of donations they are capable of
exploiting. This will by no means be an easy task, but does not seem to be
beyond the realm of possibility. Perhaps much of the work could be done
pro bono by working professionals. Obviously, conflicts of interest would
need to be monitored carefully.

For this plan to work, the IRS must set rigorous guidelines and
standards for qualified appraisers and their valuation methods.104 While the
difficulty of coming up with valuation guidelines remains an obstacle,
presumably, the private sector would be willing to help the IRS develop an
appropriate methodology. As for getting the donated IP into the appropriate
hands, some organizations have already begun to assist donors in finding
donees for their patents.105 Such organizations could be instrumental in
helping bring about this reform.
¶27

¶28
Valuation. This policy would effectively solve the overvaluation
problem that has plagued the previous FMV donation system by requiring
the IRS to set clear guidelines and standards regarding appraisers and their
valuation methods. Again, while not perfect, this proposal would at least
add considerable consistency to a valuation process which is currently
completely subjective.106

Incentives. More importantly, this plan requires a donor to use an IP
broker, thereby increasing the likelihood that the IP goes to a donee capable
of taking full advantage of the charitable gift’s potential. This plan is a big
step in the right direction as it increases the likelihood that donated IP will
not go to waste.

¶29

103

See id. at 10 (advocating a third party broker scheme).
See id. at 40-41 (arguing that the relaxed regulations promulgated by the IRS
have led to much of the charitable donations related abuses in recent years).
105
Id. at 10.
106
See Greater Good, supra note 6 (explaining that the valuation of IP is
extremely subjective).
104
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CONCLUSION
¶30
Section 882 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 has
drastically changed the law with respect to charitable donations of IP.107
While it effectively deals with the overvaluation problems common in the
previous system, it fails to fully consider the importance of strong donor
incentives. Other suggested alternatives may adequately address the
importance of promoting donations, but fail to provide a mechanism by
which the IP ends up in the hands that have the best capability to exploit its
benefits. A hybrid policy that solves the overvaluation problem while still
providing incentives for donors to give patents to a well-suited donee is a
superior alternative. The policy would permit donors to take FMV
deductions, but only where a donor has acquired an appraisal from a
qualified appraiser. Strict appraiser qualifications and valuation standards
would also be implemented as part of the policy. Further, donors would
work with a broker whose sole responsibility would be to help find an
appropriate donee for the IP, thus minimizing the likelihood that the IP
would go to waste. Such a policy would help to curb overvaluation, and
thus accomplish the designs of Congress without seriously undermining the
incentive to donate IP.

107

CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8 (explaining the differences between
section 882, now part of section 170 of the IRC, and the previous law).

